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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
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) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
No. 17067 
BRIEF OF DEFENDANTS/RESPONDENTS AND 
PLAINTIFF/CROSS-APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
Respondents (hereinafter "Snows") filed an action 
seeking specific performance of an option to purchase giveen-
to Snows by Appellants (hereinafter "Hackfords") and damag-ges 
for forcible entry. Hackfords then filed an action to hav~e 
Snows evicted and the lease and option to purchase cancelJled. 
The two cases were consolidated for trial by the trial 
court. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The case was tried to the Court which found that the 
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agreement between the parties was valid and enforceable, and 
that the Snows had properly exercised the option to purchase 
on July 15, 1977, and were entitled to decree of specific 
performance. The Court held that since the agreement between 
the parties contained no express provision allowing the 
lease to be terminated for_ breach of_ its_ 1:erms, _that _the 
proper procedure for terminating the lease was that set 
forth in the Forcible Entry and Detainer Statute of the 
State of Utah. Since the Hackfords did not institute pro-
ceedings under that statute until two months -after the Snows 
had properly noticed the exercise of their option to pur-
chase, the lease and option were in effect at the time of 
the exercise of the option. Furthermore, the acts complained 
as breaches of the lease by-the Hackfords as justification 
for-termination of the lease were not sufficient to termi-
nate the -lease. The court further-found that the Snows 
suffered damages as a result_ of- the __ Hackfords' attempts to 
use self-help methods in evicting the Snows during 1977 and 
1978 but refused to treble those damages. The court also 
refused to award attorney fees and costs as provided in the 
agreement between the parties. The Hackfords' claim for 
unlawful detainer and to have the lease and option to pur-
chase cancelled was dismissed. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Snows seek to have this Court affirm the trial court's 
decision awarding them specific performance and to remand 
/ 
,/ 
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the case with instructions to treble the damages awarded to 
Snows as a result of Hackfords' self-help actions and to 
award Snows their costs and attorney fees incurred, includ-
ing those incurred on this appeal. 
PARTY DESIGNATIONS IN BRIEF 
This case involves the consolidation of two cases at 
the lower court. Also, the trial court bifurcated the trial 
holding a separate hearing on the issue of damages. To 
avoid confusion at the trial court, the Appellants' were 
referred to as Defendants and the Respondents as Plaintiffs. 
Appellants' brief now refers to the Appellants as the Plain-
tiffs. To avoid confusion, the Respondents will be referred 
to as "Snows" and the Appellants as "Hackfords" in this 
brief. Since the transcripts of the trial consists of two 
volumes as a result of the bifurcated trial and the tran-
scripts are by two different reporters, the transcript of 
the trial held on November 30, 1978, transcribed by Edward 
Quist will be referred to herein as "Q.T." The transcript 
of the trial on October 26, 1979, transcribed by Neil Cooley 
will be referred to herein as "C.T." The Court file will be 
referred to as "R." Exhibits will be referred to as "Ex." 
Respondents controvert the alleged statement of facts 
submitted by Appellants in that it consists mainly of the 
testimony of Clifton J. Hackford which testimony was not 
supported by the other witnesses and was not believed by the 
Court. The statement of facts in Hackfords' brief is not 
-3-
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consistent with the trial court's findings of fact and many 
pages of the alleged facts are immaterial to the issues on 
appeal. Therefore, pursuant to Rule 75(p)2 of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure, the Respondents submit the follow-
ing statement of facts. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On April 15, 1975, Corwin Barton Snow, acting on behalf 
of himself and his brother, Albert Leo Snow, and Clifton J. 
Hackford, acting on behalf of himself and the other Appel-
lants, entered into an agreement whereby the Hackfords 
agreed to lease to the Snows the Hackfords' property with an 
option to the Snows to purchase the property during the term 
bf the lease. (Ex. 1) Hackfords indicated that they desired 
to retain the acreage whereon Clifton J. Hackford's house 
was located and approximately 20 acres contiguous to that 
house. Clifton J. ·Hackford, Corwin Barton Snow and a real 
estate agent who was with them, Sherman Culp, walked over 
the property and Clifton Hackford pointed out to the parties 
the 20 acres to be retained by Hackfords to be used for a 
horse pasture. (Q.T. 38-41,47,52,54) After reviewing the 
agreement with the parties, the real estate agent, Sherman 
Culp, reduced the parties agreement to writing. That agree-
ment was then signed by the Hackfords and by the Snows. (Ex. 
1,4) (A copy of that agreement is included as Appendix A to 
this brief.) 
-4- / 
/ 
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The agreement entered into by the parties provided that 
the Snows would pay the Hackfords as a lease payment $4,000.00 
per year for a three (3) year period running from May 1, 
1975, through April 30, 1978. The agreement also provided 
Snows with an option to purchase the property. The terms of 
the option were as follows: 
Option to Purchase as follows: During three year 
period, May 1, 1975 to May 1, 1978. Selling price 
of $94,500.00 for 420 acres is agreed. Downpayment 
in year purchase will equal 29% of sale price. 
Balance financed at 7% of unpaid amounts per year 
paid monthly. Principal will be reduced in 15 
equal installments beginning 1 January of year 
following purchase. Lease payments will apply to 
the downpayment as follows: exercised in 6 months 
or less, $2,000.00 to apply -- 7 months to 1 year, 
$1,000.00 will apply. This time element will 
apply from 1 May of each year, lease/option to 
purchase is in effect and $4,000.00 lease has been 
paid. (Ex. 1, lines 18-22,33,34) 
All water shares and 1/3 of the oil/mineral rights 
will be transferred with the sale of property to 
buyers, subject to the payment of the property 
contract balance.. (Ex. 1, lines 16, 17) 
The real property subject to the lease and the option to 
purchase was described as: 
[R]eal property situated at: Neola (420 acre, 
Hackford Ranch), Uintah County, State of Utah. 
(Ex. 1, lines 4,5) 
The agreement also provided that if either party.failed to 
comply with or carry out the terms and conditions of the 
agreement, the defaulting party would pay all expenses of 
enforcing the agreement or any rights arising out of the 
breach thereof, including a reasonable attorney's fee. (Ex. 
1 and Appendix A to this brief, lines 44-47) The agreement 
- t:_ 
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did not contain any provision for terminating the lease in 
the event of a breach by the lessees. 
There is no disagreement between the parties as to 
where the 420 acre Hackford Ranch is located. (Q.T. 12-13; 
Ex. 3) The Hackfords admitted that they owned not more than 
445 acres of which 420 acres was the acreage that was 
leased to the Snows with an option to purchase. (Q.T. 12-
17, 30,261,273-279) At the time the lease was signed Hackfords 
were involved in a partition action, Pumpers, Inc. v. Hackford, 
the conclusion of which gave Hackfords an additional 8 
acres which-the -trial court held were not subject to the 
option to purchase. (R. 242) 
The $4,000.00 lease payment was paid each year for 
1975, 1976 and 1977 and accepted by the Hackfords as pro-
vided by the lease. (Q.T. 18) The Snows entered upon the 
land, farmed those areas suitable for cultivation, and 
grazed the remainder of the property, much of which consists 
of a river, rocks and brush. The water assessments and 
property taxes were also paid by the Snows. At times, those 
payments were late, but the Snows did see that the payments 
were made and.paid any penalties or interest. At no time 
was any interest of the Hackfords forfeited due to late 
payment. (Ex. 9; Q.T. 240) During 1975 and 1976, the Snows 
farmed all of the property except for the fenced area around 
Clifton J. Hackford's house. Pursuant to oral_ agreement 
between the parties, the hay cut from the 20 acres contiguous 
_(:._ 
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to the house which was being retained by the Hackfords, was 
baled by Snows and then delivered to Hackfords to feed their 
horses. (Finding of Fact 13; R. 243) With the consent and 
approval of Hackfords, Snows dug a silage pit on the prop-
erty and levelled the property for the future construction 
of corrals. (Q.T. 207,243,274) The Hackfords during that 
time, exercised control over the 20 acres contiguous to 
Clifton J. Hackford's house. They planted a garden, received 
the hay from that area to feed their horses and Randy Hack-
ford built a structure on that 20 acres and fenced it with 
the understanding that those lands would remain the property 
of the family. (Q.T. 118,124,126) 
In January of 1977, Albert Leo Snow contacted Clifton 
J. Hackford and informed him that he desired to exercise the 
option and to purchase the property. Clifton J. Hackford 
informed Albert Leo Snow that was agreeable and he would see 
that the paperwork was prepared. (Q.T. 223,245) On January 
25, 1977, Flying Diamond Oil Company entered into an oil and 
gas lease with the Hackfords which lease covered certain of 
the properties subject to the lease and option to purchase 
with the Snows. (Q.T. 101; Ex. 12) In April of 1977, Flying 
Diamond Oil Company, pursuant to the terms of the oil and 
gas lease, located and drilled an oil well in the Southeast 
Quarter of the Northwest Quarter of Section 23, Township 1 
South, Range 1 East, Uintah Special !1eridian. The well was 
located some distance south and east from the Hackford house 
-7-
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in an alfalfa field which had been farmed by the Snows under 
the lease for the preceding two years. (Q.T. 100-102) At 
no time prior to the construction of that well did the 
Hackfords make any claim that they intended to retain that 
20 acres rather than 20 acres contiguous to their house. 
In May of 1977, Snows paid to Hackfords and Hackfords 
accepted the $4,000.00 lease payment for the May, 1977 to 
April, 1978 lease term. On July 7, 1977, the Hackfords had 
their attorney write a letter to Albert Leo Snow advising 
him that the "Lease and option to purchase are hereby can-
celled." (Ex. 11) On receipt of that letter, Albert Leo 
Snow and his attorney, John C. Beaslin, met with Clifton J. 
Hackford and informed Hackfords that they intended to remain 
the full term of the lease and that the Snows were exercising 
the option to purchase the property. The Hackfords were 
informed that the Snows were ready, willing and able to pay 
the purchase price, either in full or pursuant to the terms 
of the earnest money agreement. (Q.T. 297-300) The meeting 
was confirmed by letter dated July 15, 1977, again informing 
Hackfords that the Snows were exercising the option to 
purchase. (Ex. 2) The Snows continued to farm the land as 
they had the preceding two years. Two months,later on Septem-
ber 27, 1977, the Hackfords served the Snows with a document 
entitled Notice of Termination of Lease Agreement and Notice 
of Eviction and Requirement to Vacate Premises Within Three 
Days. That document stated that "the earnest money receipt 
-8-
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and offer to lease, dated April 15, 1975, is hereby terminated 
and cancelled this date. [September 27, 1977]." (Ex. 17) 
The date of the notice which claimed to be the effective 
date of the cancellation was more than two months after the 
exercise of the option by Snows. Upon receipt of that 
document, the Snows filed Civil No. 9558 seeking enforcement 
of the option to purchase. (R. 50) Hackfords answered the 
complaint on October 27, 1977. (R. 54) Months later, on 
February 6, 1978, the Hackfords filed Civil No. 9728 seeking 
to have the Court declare the lease and option to purchase 
terminated and to find that the Snows were unlawful detainers 
on the basis of the September 27, 1977, notice. (R. 1) 
After the filing of the two lawsuits in the spring of 
1978, a dispute arose as to which party should have possession 
of the lands-involved. The trial court, after a hearing, 
entered an order allowing Snows to remain in possession. (R. 
91-92) The Hackfords then resorted to Be1£-help actions to 
evict ~the Snows. (Q.T. 187) Those actions included turning 
the Snows' cattle out on the public road, (C.T. 78-81), 
removing hay and fences, (C.T. 25-35,46-52), locking the 
gates and blocking the entrance to the property, (C.T. 57-
61; Q.T. 115,177-184), and by false representations having 
the Uintah County Sheriff's Department issue a citation for 
trespass. (Q.T. 90) The court, after hearing the testimony, 
also viewed the property and then entered its decree. 
(C.T. 16-17) 
- _9-
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POINT I: THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY FOUND THAT THE 
LEASE BETWEEN THE PARTIES. HAD NOT BEEN 
TERMINATED AT THE TIME SNOWS EXERCISED 
THE OPTION TO PURCHASE INCLUDED IN THE 
LEASE BECAUSE THE LEASE DID NOT CONTAIN 
A FORFEITURE PROVISION, THE LEASE HAD 
NOT OTHERWISE BEEN FORFEITED AND ANY 
ALLEGED BREACHES WERE INSUFFICIENT TO 
JUSTIFY A FORFEITURE OF THE LEASE. 
It is a general rule of real property law that if a 
le-ase does not have a forfetture provisiorr-whi-ch~ sets· -forth --
the procedure to follow in the event of a breach, the 
lessor's remedy is to sue for damages. Browns Administra-
tors v. Bragg, 22 Ind. 122 (1864); Buchannan v. Crites, 150 
P.2d 100 (1944); Western Rebuilders v. Felmly, 391 P.2d 383 
(Or. 1964); Thompson v. Harris, 452 P.2d 122 (Ariz. 1969); 
Shultz v. Raney, 64 N.M. 366, 328 P.2d 941 (1958); Jennings 
v. Amend, 101 Kan. 130, 165 P. 845 (1917); 49 Am.Jur.2d, 
Landlord and Tenant, §1020. 
As an additional remedy, most jurisdictions have en-
acted statutes which set forth the procedure by which a 
landlord can get a court order declaring-the lease £orfeited. 
However, that procedure must be strictly complied with 
before the lease is forfeited. Carstensen v. Hansen, 107 
U. 234, 152 P.2d 954 (1944); Browns Administrators v. Bragg, 
supra, J. Krasnowicki, Ownership and Development of Land, 
1965, at 177. (A copy of the Bragg case and the notes 
following it are attached to Snows' memorandum, R. 191) 
The State of Utah has adopted a statutory procedure which 
allows a landlord to obtain a court order declaring the 
-10-
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lease forfeited when the lease does not contain an express 
provision terminating the lease. That statute is the Forcible 
Entry and Detainer Statute, Utah Code Ann. §78-36-1, et ~­
The provisions of that statute must be strictly complied 
with before the court will grant an order terminating a 
lease. Van Zyverden v. Farrar, ___ 15 Ut. 2d 36 7, 393 P. 2d 468 
(1964). Even if the statute is followed or if the lease 
contains a forfeiture provision, the courts are reluctant to 
forfeit a lease for minor breaches if the forfeiture would 
cause the parties to loose their investment. Perkins v. 
Spencer, 121 U. 468, 243 P.2d 446 (1952); School District 
Re-20 v. Panucci, 490 P.2d 711 (Col. 1971). 
The Hackfords at trial and on appeal have maintained 
that the lease in question should be terminated for failure 
by the lessee to timely pay the property taxes as required 
by the lease. The Hackfords have failed to comprehend that 
the law only allows a lease to be forf,eited without a court 
order, if the terms of the lease provide a procedure by 
which the lease can be forfeited. If the lease does not 
provide a procedure by which the lease is terminated, then 
the parties seeking to terminate the lease must strictly 
follow the provisions of the Forcible Entry and Detainer 
Statute and the lease is then only cancelled when the Court, 
after a hearing, enters its order forfeiting the lease. 
Utah Code Ann. §78-36-10. The cases cited by the Hackfords, 
-11-
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in support of their position that leases may be terminated 
by notice, discuss leases or other-agreements in which there 
are express provisions setting forth the procedure by which 
the landlord may terminate the lease in accordance with the 
agreed upon termination clause. In each case, the court 
carefully_ considered the procedure ...set. £or.th _in .the_ ..agree-_ 
ment and if the lessor had strictly followed the lease 
provisions, then the forfeiture of the lease was upheld. 
None of the cases cited by the Hackfords involved an agree-
ment or lease without a provision authorizing the lessor to 
terminate the lease in the event of default. Therefore, the 
issue before this Court was not considered in those cases. 
The Hackfords have argued that the Snows breached the 
lease by failure to pay the 1977 water assessment when due, 
and for late payment of previous years property taxes. The 
lease between theparties contains no provision setting 
forth how the lease is to be forfeited because of the fail-
ure to timely pay the water assessments. The language the 
Hackfords cite at page 24 of their brief for a forfeiture 
provision is not a forfeiture provision and has no relation-
ship to the breach of any covenant to pay the property tax 
or water assessments. It is a provision providing that in 
the event the tenant failed to execute a future agreement 
between the parties, then any earnest money could be retained 
by the lessor as liquidated damages. (Ex. 1, lines 39-40) 
-12-
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The Hackfords, at trial, argued that they unilaterally 
cancelled the lease when they had a local a~torney mail a 
letter to the Snows on July 7, 1977. (Ex. 11) That letter 
was not properly served, it did not give the Snows the 
alternative to cure any breach, or otherwise comply with the 
requirements of Utah Code Ann. §78-36-3(5). The Hackfords 
did not follow up on that letter to seek a court declaration 
that the lease be forfeited. Utah Code Ann. §78-36-10. The 
Hackfords, by their unilateral act of mailing a letter to 
Snows, could not cancel the lease. The Hackfords acknowl-
edged that the letter did not effect a cancellation of the 
lease when two months later, on September 27, 1977, they 
served the Snows with a notice to evict. By that notice, 
they abandoned the claim that the prior letter cancelled the 
lease and stated that the lease was terminated as of the 
date of the notice. A complaint seeking treble .damages and 
to have the lease forfeited as of September 27, 1977, was 
then·filed in October, 1977. (R. 1-4) No mention was made 
in Hackfords' complaint of the first letter sent by Mr. 
Colton. 
Two months prior to the date of the eviction notice, 
the Snows had exercised their option to purchase the prop-
erty by letter dated July 15, 1977, and had informed the 
Hackfords that they were ready, willing and able to pay the 
full purchase price. The trial court found that the letter 
of July 15, 1977, was a valid exercise of the option to 
-1~-
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purchase which finding the Hackfords have not disputed. 
(Finding of Yact 4; R. 241) Since the Snows had exercised 
their option to purchase and had tendered the purchase price 
two months before the Hackfords cotmnenced action to have the 
lease forfeited, the trial court correctly held that the 
lease,had··not··been· forfeit-ed·-at-··-the·time -of ·the-~-exercise--of- · 
the option. (Finding of Fact 7; R. 245) 
The trial court also found that the alleged breaches by 
the Snows for late payment of taxes or water assessments 
were insufficient grounds to terminate the lease, even if 
the Hackfords had followed the proper procedure to have a 
court terminate the agreement. (Finding of Fact 9; R. 242) 
Also, the court did not find that Snows breached the lease 
for. failure to maintain -ditches or. _fences.. These __ ~findings -
are supported by the evidence that the Hackfords had ac-
cepted the $4,000..-00 lease.payment from the -Snows in May of-
1977' had o~cured .all al~leged breaches befora--the notice to 
evict was served, and none of the alleged breaches caused 
any damage to Hackfords. 
The trial court properly decided that the letter of 
July 7, 1977, did not cancel the lease, that the eviction 
notice served September 27, 1977, could not cancel the lease 
because the Snows had previously exercised the option to 
purchase and, even if the Hackfords had properly pursued an 
action to obtain a forfeiture of the lease, the alleged 
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breaches by the Snows were non-existent or insufficient to 
declare a forfeiture of the lease. 
, c 
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POINT II. SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE WAS THE APPROPRIATE 
REMEDY WHEN HACKFORDS REFUSED TO COMPLY 
- WITH THE TERMS. OF THE WRITTEN OPTION TO 
PURCHASE AFTER SNOWS PROPERLY EXERCISED 
THAT OPTION, HAD PAID THE LEASE PAYMENTS 
AND HAD BEEN IN POSSESSION OF THE LAND 
FOR THREE YEARS UNDER THE LEASE WITH THE 
OPTION TO PURCHASE. 
This Court recently reiterated the standard to be 
applied .in deciding whether to grant specific performance of 
land contracts when one party claims the terms of the con-
tract are not sufficiently definite. The Court stated that: 
Before specific performance will be employed by 
the courts to enforce a contract, the terms of the 
agreement-must be reasonably certain so that the 
parties know what is required of them, and defi-
nite enough that the courts can delineate the 
intent of the contracting parties. In reviewing 
the written agreement evidencing the contract, and 
any ambiguity inherent in the language used, 
extrinsic evidence -may be ceonsidered by the court 
to .. del·ineate :the~ intent oL_the parties and the 
enforceability-of the contract. Thus, courts are 
provided a means by which they can look beyond the 
terms found in the written agreement to ascertain 
the intent of the contracting·parti·es. If from 
this-examinati.on of the ~transaction the courts 
determinec-the ·actuaL_contract--is certain and--the 
obligation and rights of the parties defined, then 
they may employ their equitable powers to enforce 
the contract via specific performance. Reed v. 
Alvey, 610 P.2d 1374, 1377 (Ut. 1980). 
In Reed v. Alvey, the agreement provided that the 
plaintiff was purchasing real property described as "corner 
of Hillville and Ninth East." The trial court ruled that 
the description was too vague and incomplete and denied 
specific performance. This Court reversed stating that the 
extrinsic evidence presented by the plaintiff concerning the 
transaction defined the property in sufficient detail to 
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support specific performance. 
In Stauffer v. Call, 589 P.2d 1219 (Ut. 1979), the 
parties had entered into an agreement for the purchase of 
real property. The property was described as: 
~ 
[T]wo houses using the natural boundaries, sic, 
which is approximately 10 acres collectively plus 
approximately, sic, 1/5 water rights. Calls to 
retain the fencecr-natural farm ground on the SE 
which is approximately 40 acres PLUS 2/5 water 
rights. The remaining ground southeast of the old 
highway to be Stauffers, along with the two houses. 
Id., 1220. 
After the agreement was executed, the parties attempted to 
agree on the description of the land sold. During that 
time, the buyers occupied and possessed the land and made 
improvements on the houses. The trial court received parole 
evidence as to the intent of the parties and then entered 
its order denying -specific performance, finding.that the 
description was not sufficient to allow specific performance. 
This Court reversed finding that to deny specific performance 
would be to grant to·the··sellers~a "mighty windfall" due to 
the enhanced value of the property and ordered the trial 
court to take testimony as to what was said and done as it 
related to the description of the property and then to 
decide the legal description of the land. 
In Eliason v. Watts, 615 P.2d 427 (Ut. 1980), the 
defendant had contended that the earnest money receipt and 
offer to purchase was unenforceable due to ambiguities in 
the description of the property. The trial court received 
parole evidence relating to the description of the property 
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and granted specific performance. This Court affirmed that 
decision holding that if the trial court finds that "the 
terms of the contract were sufficiently complete and clear 
to justify a decree of specific performance, its judgment 
will stand if it has substantial support in the records." 
Id. 1 429. 
In the present case, the trial court found that: 
The reciting of the number of acres involved, 
i.e., 420 acres, the recitation of the property 
being in Uintah County, Utah, the description of 
the property as the "Hackford Ranch," the oc-
cupancy and farming of the acreage by the plain-
tiffs and the receipt of all lease monies by the 
defendants for the three (3) years of the lease, 
which lease monies defendants made no attempt to 
return, memorialize the description of the 420 
subject to the terms of the option to purchase and 
the agreement of the parties. (Finding of Fact 7; 
R. 242) 
The trial cou:r-t ~further_ found that the 20- acres_ retained by 
the Hackfords was the area southwest of the house of Clifton 
J. Hackfo:t'd which included the-_horse--pasture and out build-
ing constructed by the-Hackfords. The-Court-held that the 
actions of the Snows in delivering hay from the 20 acres 
next to Clifton Hackford's house together with the approval 
of the Hackfords of the location of the silage pit, the 
construction of an out building by the Defendants on the 
property contiguous to Clifton Hackford's house, and all 
other evidence affirmed that the 20 acres retained by 
Hackfords was the 20 acres located next to Clifton Hack-
ford's house. (Findings of Fact 12 and 13; R. 243) 
-18-
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The present case is also similar to Brady v. Fausett, 
546 P.2d 246 (Ut. 1976). In Brady v. Fausett, the property 
subject to the lease and option to purchase was described as 
real property located in Rio Blanco and Garfield Counties, 
Colorado. This Court sustained the trial court's granting 
of specific performance stating that the acceptance by the 
seller of monies pursuant to the contract, none of which was 
ever refunded, and the buyer's occupancy, operation of and 
improvement of the properties memorialized the descriptions 
of the property. In the present case, the Hackfords have 
accepted the lease payments including the payment made in 
May of 1977, and the Snows possessed the property for three 
years, farmed and pastured the property, built a silage pit 
and prepared an,area~-for corrals. The Hackfords, on the 
area -they retained, raised a garden, built an additional out 
building and _fenced part of it, as well as obtained the hay 
from that acreage. Those actions sustain and support the 
testimony of the real estate agent, Sherman Culp, and the 
Snows that at the time the agreement was entered into, the 
Hackfords owned at least 440 acres of which they desired to 
lease and grant an option to purchase to the Snows for 420 
acres, retaining to themselves, the house and 20 acres 
contiguous thereto. Settlement of the Pumpers, Inc. case 
eventually gave the Hackfords an additional 8 acres bringing 
their total acreage to 448 acres. The 448 acres was the 
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only property owned by Hackfords. 
The Hackfords reliance on the cases of Davison v. Robbins, 
517 P.2d 1026 (Ut. 1973); and, Pitcher v. Lauritzen, 423 
P.2d 491 (1967), is misplaced. In Davison v. Robbins, the 
court refused to grant specific performance because the 
earnest money receipt was only an agreement to agree in tlhat 
the parties agreed that at some later date the seller wouJld 
decide which acres to sell and then the buyer had a right- ·to 
refuse that offer. In Pitcher v. Lauritzen, the court 
refused specific performance holding that the parties ha& 
abandoned the contract. The court also indicated that the· 
description was insufficient since the property to be solcii 
was designated on a map which was to be attached, which maap 
was not produced at trial. 
At the time the-Snows ~nd Hackfords signed the earneg;t 
money receipt and off er to lease there was no uncertainty· as 
to what property was to-be subject to the lease and the 
option to purchase. The parties, with Mr. Culp, the realtt.or? 
walked over the property and Mr. Hackford indicated to Mr .. 
Culp what property the Hackfords desired to retain and wha1t 
property was to be leased by the Snows. (Q.T. 38-41) The 
earnest money receipt and option to purchase was then pre-
pared and signed by the parties and the Snows entered intoo 
possession of the property. During 1975 and 1976, feelinggs 
between the parties were amicable. The Snows farmed those 
I")(\ 
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parts of the property which were subject to cultivation and 
grazed livestock on the remainder. On the acreage the 
Hackfords were retaining, they planted a garden, received 
the hay therefrom for their horses, built an outbuilding and 
fenced part of it. In the winter and spring of 1977, Flying 
Diamond Oi 1 Co. .obtained a lease £rom the. Hackfords .and then 
drilled an oil well on part of the property being fanned by 
the Snows. The Snows paid the rent for the lease term 
running from May, 1977, to April of 1978 which was accepted 
and retained by Hackfords. Then in the summer of 1977, the 
Hackfords changed their minds and decided that instead of 
the acreage by the house, they desired to retain the 20 
acres where the oil well was located. Pursuant to that 
unilateral change of mind, the Hackfords attempted to take 
possession of the 20 acres. When they were unsuccessful, 
they then attempted to terminate the lease and option to 
purchase claiming that the description was not sufficient. 
This Court in its recent decisions has manifested its 
intent to enforce agreements between the parties especially 
when the seller, who is attempting to have .a court of equity 
void its agreement, will receive a windfall from the in-
creased value of the land, or in this case, development of 
the oil rights. There was no uncertainty at the time the 
agreement was entered into by the parties and the actions of 
the parties support and confirm that agreement and that 
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finding by the trial court. It was the mind of the Hackfords 
that changed when the oil well was drilled rather than the 
terms of the agreement. This was recognized by the trial 
court which properly exercised its equitable powers in 
granting specific performance for the Snows. 
j 
·~· 
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POINT III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT FAILED TO 
TREBLE THE DAMAGES AWARDED TO SNOWS AS RE-
~UIRED BY ST TUTE AS A RESULT OF HACKFORDS' 
ORCIBLE ENTRY ON THE LANDS POSSESSED BY 
SNOWS. 
Utah's Forcible Entry Statute, Utah Code Ann. §78-36-1, 
provides that: 
Every person is guilty of a forcible entry who 
either: 
(1) By breaking open doors, windows or other parts 
of a house, or by fraud, intimidation or stealth, 
or by any kind of violence or circumstances of 
terror enters upon or into any real property; or 
(2) After entering peaceably upon real property, 
turns out by force, threats or menacing conduct 
the-party in actual possession. 
The Forcible Entry Statute was enacted for the purpose 
of preventing disturbances of the peace by self-help actions 
of landlords or other persons -attempting to evict parties in 
possession -:-of property. Buchannan--v .-- Crites,- 106 Ut. 428, 
150-P.2d 100 (1944); King v. Firm, 3 Ut.2d 419, 285 P.2d 
1114 (1955). In determining whether the defendant was 
guilty of forcible entry, the _court- in Freeway Park Bldg., 
Inc. v; Wes-tern St-ates Hot:eL-5upply ,-- 22 Ut .-'2d 266, 45T P .-2d 
778, stated that: 
Everyone is guilty of a forcible entry who conmits 
the acts specified. All that an occupant needs to 
show in order to be protected against self-help 
eviction is to show that he was in peaceful 
possession of the land within five (5) days prior 
to the unlawful entry. If this is shown by a 
tenant in possession, the one entitled thereto 
must secure his rights under the statute; and if 
he- takes the law into his own hands and turns a 
tenant in peaceful possession out by means of 
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force, fraud, intimidation, stealth or by any kind 
of violence, he makes himself liable to that 
tenant for damag~s. 451 P.2d at 781. 
The removal of the doors -from the premises, the changing of 
the locks on the tenant's door or the removal of the tenant 
from his business office pursuant to a writ of attachment 
have all been held to be acts which constitute forcible 
entry. Peterson v. Platt, 16 Ut.2d 330, 400 P.2d 507 (1965), 
Buchannan v. Crites, supra, Freeway Park Bldg., -Inc. v. 
Western States Wholesale Supply, supra, and King v. Firm, 
supra. A finding by the court that the action of the de-
fendant constituted forcible entry "[M]akes it ·mandatory 
upon the court to render judgment for three times the amount 
of the damages thus assessed." Forrester v. Cook, 77 Ut. 
137, 292 P. 206 (1930). 
The trial court found that Snows were in lawful pos-
session of the property at all times during the proceedings. 
(R. 238,244) Furthermore, the trial court had entered an 
order allowing Snows to remain in temporary possession of 
the property. (R. 91-92) While Snows were in peaceful 
possession of the property, Hackfords attempted several 
times to evict Snows by self-help methods. Hackfords used 
those self-help methods even though they were fully aware of 
the Order granting possession of the property to Snows. 
(Q.T. 187) Hackfords, in attempting to evict Snows, turned 
Snows' cows out onto a public road, (C.T. 78-81), removed 
hay belonging to Snows, (C.T. 46-52), removed fences from 
-24-
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the property, (C.T. 25-35), and by false representations had 
a Uintah County Sheriff's Deputy issue a ticket to an employee 
of Snows working on the property. (Q.T. 90) In addition to 
destroying and removing property belonging to Snows, Hackfords 
locked the gate on the entranceway to the property, (C.T. 
57-61; Q.T. 115, 177, 184), . and .blocked_ the. entrance -to. the . 
property with their truck. (Q.T. 178-184) Hackfords further 
admitted at trial that they had prevented Snows from enter-
ing on the property despite instructions from the officers 
of the Uintah County Sheriff's Department that they were not 
to interfere with Snows' possession of the property. (Q.T. 
89-90) 
Even though the Snows were in peaceful possession of 
the property at all times ·and the court awarded Snows judg-
ment for the damages they_haa suffered as a result of the 
unlawful actions of Hackfords, (R. 238,244), the trial 
court, refused to treble the .damages as required-by Utah 
Code Ann. §78-36-10 holding that the_conduct of Hackfords 
did not violate the provisions of the Forcible Entry and 
Detainer Statute. _ (R. _238, 247) Snows assert, as stated in 
Freeway Park, supra, that any time a party commits any of 
the acts specified in Utah Code Ann. §78-36-1, that party is 
guilty of forcible entry. This Court has held that replac-
ing a lock on a door or otherwise blocking the entrance to 
any real property is forcible entry. King v. Firm, _supra; 
-25-
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Peterson v. Platt, supra. The self-help actions on the part 
of Hackfords fall squarely within the provisions of Utah 
Code Ann. §78-36-1 making Hackfords guilty of forcible 
entry. Since Hackfords' unlawful actions caused damages to 
Snows, it was mandatory that the trial court treble those 
damages. ~ The trial-~, court~ s failure to treble the.-Oamag~s, 
was error and judgment· should be entered for Snows for 
treble the amount of damages found by the trial court. 
-26-
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POINT IV. THE PROVISION IN THE LEASE AND OPTION TO 
PURCHASE BY WHICH THE PARTIES AGREED tHAT 
THE DEFAULTING PARTY WOULD PAY THE ExPE-NSES 
OF ENFORCING THE AGREEMENT, INCLUDING A 
REASONABLE ATTORNEYS' FEE, IS AN INTEGRAL 
PART OF THE AGREEMENT AND SHOULD BE ENFORCED. 
The Earnest Money Receipt and Of fer to Lease agreement 
between the parties provides that: 
When the contract between parties provides that the 
defaulting partyshall pay all costs and expenses including 
a _reasonable attorney's _fee- incurred in enforcing the agree-
ment ,- that- -clause is _enforceable.__ _and the defaulting -party is 
responsible -for all expenses incurred. Jones Y. _Hinkle, 611 
P.2d 7JT-(Ut. 1980); Jensen--v. Manila- Corporation of the Church 
of Jesus Chri-s t of- Latter- :Day Saints, 565 P. 2d 63 (Ut. 
1977). This __ rule_ is based -on the premise_ that_ the bargain 
between--the partie-s includes the payment of attorneys' fees 
by the defaulting party, and the failure of the Court to 
enforce that provision would result in the Court rewriting 
the contract. Jensen v. Manila Corporation of the Church 
of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints, at 65. This Court has 
also recently adopted the general rule that: 
-27-
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[A] provision for payment of attorney's fees in a 
contract includes attorney's fees incurred by the 
prevailing party on appeal as well as at trial, if 
the action is brought to enforce the contract .... 
Mana ement Servi·ces Cor oration v. Develo ment 
Associat~s, 7 P. 06 Ut. 19 0 
The Earnest Money Receipt and Offer To Lease Agreement 
between the parties provided that if a party failed to 
comply with the terms and conditions of the agreement, then 
the defaulting party·would pay all costs of enforcing agree-
ment, including,a reasonable attorney's fee. The trial 
court found that Hackfords had.failed~to comply with the 
terms=-and"=conditions-,of- the,,:agreement -between- the· parties 
when Hackfords refused to convey the property to Snows. 
Snows were required to obtain legal counsel to enforce their 
rights -arising~ out __ o£ the _agreement and to _defend the _-appeal 
brought··by: Hackfords~ ~:_The- testimony=-showed:::--that:Snows-chad-
incurr.ed-=~~~ttorn,eys ~ .:..c:f ee~ith~he lawJirm~-of --~Beas-lin ;~~ 
Nygaard, Coke & Vincent, and with-the-law firm.of McKeachnie 
& Allred-, in enforcing the terms- of the.-contract _between=the 
parties. (T. 88-93)- There was no evidence-indicating that 
Snows tlid not in6ur those legal~fees or that~hose legal 
fees were not reasonable. Since the contract between the 
parties provided that the defaulting party was to pay all 
costs, including a reasonable attorneys' fee incurred by the 
prevailing party, the trial court erred in ruling that each 
party was to bear _its own cost and attorneys' fees. The 
_')Q_ 
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case should be remanded to the trial court for a deter-
mination of the amount of the attorneys' fee incurred by 
Snows for the trial and the appeal of this case. 
-29-
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CONCLUSION 
The trial court corre~tly held that the- lease and the 
option to purchase had not been cancelled at the time the 
Snows exercised the option to purchase. Since the Snows had 
properly exercised their option to purchase, had occupied 
and -used- the· property for -three~years; '""and--made~~impr-ovements 
thereon, the trial court acted properly in granting specific 
performance. . To have failed _to grant specific performance _ 
in this factual setting would have been an abuse of dis-
cretion. The trial court did err when it failed to treble 
the damages awarded to Snows and when it refused to award 
Snows their costs and attorney fees. 
Snows respectfully request-that-the trial- court's 
decree of_ specific performance-.:.be sustained and that the 
case be remanded-with __ instructions to treble~the __ damages- -
incurred -by' Snows- as a result of the self-help-~ actions-- of - -
Hackfords, ~-and- to award-= Snows~- a reasonable -attorneys' -fee - =---
incurred at trial and on appeal. 
1980. 
Respectfully submitted this J<{tl. day of December, 
clrkB. Alred 
MCKEACHNIE & ALLRED, P.C. 
53 South 200 East 
Vernal, Utah 84078 
Telephone - *"'/:=:c:::..d~~=L --=-==---
At tornevf:=-:f;,;~~~i~l\~~~~~:.:~---:_-
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EARN~. f MONEY RECEIPT AND OFFER ; LEASE 
''This is a legally binding form, if not unders tood, seek competen t advice." 
County, State o! Uta h, 
:.Dewing !lxtures and equipment: 
.A 
thall be p er ~";or a. leasehold t:_i:m o! 
!ollows: d2 Sc? .z; f? !!/'-'ft''../ J, .,,;.,., 
tlt/ c C' / /f-1 /I.{ / <? 7 
Tenant responsible Landlord .responsible !or 
hrlor Walls~. Interior Walls__Q_, Structural Repair__Q__, I nterior 
ml__Q__, Heating a nd Air Conditioning Equl~ment_Q__, Electrlcal Equipment(_> __ , Light Globes and Tubes_i2___, G la ss Breakage...{;__, 
Remova!_L__, Janitor -12_, Others__:.T_-_,.i<c..' !'-. .:..1 ./_-'M"-'--'A-'-.:.."~l'_,·_, .;_'.:.."c__:....f....:c--;..:c.,_,.c_:;CL=S;;>.----'.,.-· . ..+L...:rc....::.:;./c..:k:._1'-'· ~'-;,ff---'v"''-''-'-/1-",.-'f..::(_JL..___.:;\'-i~l-(~:iL/,U.l<'./-=L' _,_, _...:..... _ _ _ 
!IDS AND INSURANCE: T enant pays (T) Landlord pays (L) 
1111L_. Water f , Sewer_~O-~ Telephone-2..___ Real Property Tax f , Increase a bove 19 7 Y la Real Property Tax I . Per -
Tu __ O_, Fire Insurance on Bu!lding _ _ O _ _ , Flre Insurance of Personal Property _ _ CJ _ _ , Gl a ss Insu r ance_Q__ Other~O~--------
i8ID bt responsible for losses from n egligen ce or misconduct of himself. his employees, o r inv itees. 
property of tenant the premises until r ent and other charges are fully p a id. 
7/.· C" i , 1 
:s receh•ed a nd offer is made s ubject t o the written accept~nce of the landlord endor sed h e r eon with · ::J days fr om date hereof . a nd -~ !r.r - 1~ ";;..:r ::. c f thr r.:lon~- h e refr. reLeip!ed .s~li cante~ ' th1 ~0I"rer wJt.hou t d amage to -..:he undersign e d agen:. V..' ithin / ~ Cc.ys a ft e r 
b; Jta~e p~pared by l a ndlord i n a f orm consistent wi t h th~ a b ove pro,.·i s tons and contain ing othe r customary an.d reasonable gen era: p :ro\·ts io r: s . 
cm w exer..Ote a writte n lea s e l\'hich will supersede and abrogate this agreem ent. 
f'tnt the ten an t fail s t o execute sa id le a s e a s herein pro\' ided, th e amou n ts. p a. id hereon shall. a~ the op ti on of t he landl ord , be r eta ined a ~ 
arreed damages, or landlord m ay elec t t o r e t ain said s u m a n d to requi r e specific performa nce. 
•imtood and agreed t :-i.at t h e t erms writ ten tn t his 
nt made by anyone relative t o th ts transact ion 
receipt constitu te tht- en t i re P r elim1nary C ontr a.ct between the t enan t and landlo: d . a nd th s. ~ 
sha ll be construed t o be a pa r t of this transac tion unle ::.s incorpor att:d i n wr~ t : !"". f: h e:cr:. 
/ I / Jl.1__ . 
a..~---·-·_._,_1~>---------------~Agent 
Broker C ompany 
/ ,...._:__ 
By-----------~-~-'~'--------------~~ 
am tir a.gne to carry out a nd f u l fJll t h e terms and conditions sp ecif ie d abo ve , and the JA.ndiord warran t s that. he has good ar:C s~f!i c :ci~ 
arid or sell the s ubj ec t propert~· in accordance herrw i th and t o provide r easonable evidence c t s:.;.r}; right o r. demand of tcn ar. t. . If e i: !.~ r 
1 to ~o. ht agrees to p3y all expen~es of enforcing t h J$ a!Z r eement, or of a ny r i g h t a.r i s i ng o u t of t he breach ther t:" .• f , inclu d in g ::::. r t :~:. or, a:.. ~ 1 
er:1 agrees in cons lderation of the efforts o! t he a gent in procuring a tenant . t o p a y said a ge !1!. a jease commiss ion . 
9ilf5Sly agreed th at ln the event the Le.r;~ee purc h a ses the property d u r i ng thr term of this l e as.e o r Within two vea r s after expira : wr: o~ t h f' 
,-4-. -
Jefl"al or extension thereof . the L essor agr ees t o pay a sale commission o f o/(:. of .sa l e price. 
. . .·'. {.:.:.,--//'.'1/ · / / ' ~ / f 
.:{;.;-::(: l : I~ - / _04-<u:r:: :l : Lc-1-<. ~~1 /.J1J;J;;1 4-445c)- # t --ZJ 
1 / · Inrndlor d · / , 7 / 1 T en ar. : / . \) D a : e 
zl;; , .. cµ«~~f7£,,,Ji ~,IL~ ;t.c S:?~v4d .. ;.) i?-- l} 
J~/6,, .>r<~~f (/ T enan : D ate 
't I · , 
_Q{},u_ ~r 1 ;c I ei c0/ <fJ". 0 1 
,,_y: I / /- / l /; 1 / 
. t ;.< ,,..,<ls l &c.r·C-/r~ 
53 1S ta:c J,. w rc qu!H•.c: broke ~ " r0 fu r nish cooir~ ('I: th i ~ contrR rt bear ln i;: a ll s112 nature~ t o tt>n a n t and le ndlord Dt> Drnd r nt u pon the mrthods u~ed , one o~ t he 1c il t. 
5.; 1n r, t o rr.i " rn t: s: bf" comnlf" :~· -
J Hr kno wJ ectr>"r re ri:- in t r> ~ R t 1ns.l copy 0f thr fore~o ln.IZ' a~reemrn t be arinr a ll s1"7 n a tu!"~ 
!: t ... 
I· · , Land1 or : r.::.:. ·. 
- ------ ----" · 
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